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INTRODUCTION
If there is one economic miracle that continues to inspire awe and
significantly transform the global economy, it is the economic
resurgence of China.1 The country—the most populous in the world—
recently enjoyed the longest period of sustained rapid economic growth
in history, with over two decades of more than ten percent annual gross
domestic product (GDP) growth, and it continues to grow. In 2010,
China GDP grew by 10.3%, in 2011 it grew by 9.2%, and in 2012 it
grew by nearly 8%.2 This growth continues even as the advanced
industrial economies of Europe and the United States contend with their
worst economic crisis since World War II.3 Indeed, the slowdown in the
advanced economies has accelerated the apparent rate of China’s climb;
China’s GDP is now second only to the United States.4 Since the 1970s,
this growth has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and
fundamentally changed the face of China from an agrarian society to an
industrial and urbanized one.5 China has rapidly climbed the ranks as
both a producer and consumer of high technology goods and services.
By some measures, China may already have the world’s largest
technology-based economy.6
In high technology, the country is now the world’s largest patent
filer.7 It is second only to the United States in total annual publications
1 This research was based on 24 months of fieldwork in 2007 and 2008, three months of
fieldwork in 2009 and 2010 and three months of work in the spring and summer of 2012. Using a
seven-point research theme instrument with various stakeholders in China’s technology standards
bodies, government ministries, technology companies, academia, and consulting firms, we
performed nearly 400 semi-structured interviews. Interviewees included both Chinese and
foreigners, providing a wide range of insights and perspectives into China’s innovation and
technology standards system and policies. All interviewees agreed to speak on the condition that
their names and other identifying information would be excluded from any publications.
Therefore, due to privacy requirements in our research protocol, this Article will not cite the
interviewees in any identifiable detail.
2 2000–2011 NIAN GUO MIN JINGJI HE SHE HUI FA ZHAN TONG JI GONG BAO [2001–2011
CITIZENS’ ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS REPORTS], NAT’L STATISTICS
BUREAU OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OECD (2006); OECD, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY OUTLOOK 2006 139–40, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/it_outlook-2006-en.
See generally NAT’L STATISTICS BUREAU OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [NSBPRC]
(2001–2012).
3 See, e.g., Gordon Isfeld, Effects of ‘Great Recession’ Linger, GAZETTE (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://www.montrealgazette.com/business/Effects+Great+Recession+linger/8000381/story.html.
4 Chester Dawson & Jason Dean, Rising China Bests a Shrinking Japan, WALL ST. J., Feb.
14,
2011,
at
A1,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704593604576140912411499184.html.
5 See generally TOM MILLER, CHINA’S URBAN BILLION (2012).
6 See Alan L. Porter, Nils C. Newman, J. David Roessner, David M. Johnson & Xiao-Yin
Jin, International High Tech Competitiveness: Does China Rank #1?, 21 TECH. ANALYSIS &
STRATEGIC MGMT. 173, 173–193 (2009) (comparing three selected indicators that cover national
technology-based competitiveness and concluding that the indicators all suggest a dramatic
continuing increase in the competitiveness of China’s technology-based economy).
7 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS (2012),
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of peer-reviewed academic journal articles.8 Similarly, thanks to a
steady increase in research and development (R&D) spending over the
last decade, China is also second only to the United States in R&D
spending. The 11th Five Year Plan called for raising the level of R&D
spending to over two percent of GDP by 2010 and, although not met,
R&D spending grew sharply during this period.9
While China’s accomplishments are legion, all is not as it appears.
For one, China’s miracle, particularly in high technology is very onesided. Although high technology exports account for 29% of China’s
total exports in 2011, and these exports continue to grow at over sixteen
percent per year, over ninety percent of these goods are from a single
industry: electronics and information and communication technology.10
Notably, China’s growing research and publication capabilities and
accomplishments in nanotechnology, biotechnology, aerospace,
genetics, and materials science have not yet translated into major
economic activity. Second, in addition to being highly imbalanced, the
actual innovation capabilities of Chinese firms lie not in novel-product
innovation (the creation of wholly new goods and services), but rather
in incremental and second generation innovation.11 These innovation
capabilities have developed in response to the constraints facing
organizations in China over the last thirty years, particularly in terms of
access to human resources and physical and financial capital.12 Chinese
firms have created a powerful manufacturing capability in the country
and thus enabled ongoing improvement and competitiveness even as
input factor prices, particularly labor, continue to rise.13 What is
available at http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/wipi/.
8 ROYAL SOCIETY, KNOWLEDGE, NETWORKS AND NATIONS, RS POLICY DOC. 03/11 (2011),
available
at
http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2011/42949761
34.pdf.
9 China’s R&D Spending Surges 21.9%, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 22, 2012, 5:32 PM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-02/22/content_14670805.htm; Facts and Figures:
China’s Main Targets for 2006–2010; CENT. GOV’T CHINA (Mar. 6, 2006),
http://english.gov.cn/2006-03/06/content_219504.htm.
10 Nian Guo Min Jing Ji He She Hui Fa Zhan Tong Ji Gong Bao [2000–20012 Citizens’
Economic and Social Development Statistics Reports], PEOPLE (Feb. 23, 2013, 5:09 AM),
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0223/c1001-20574506.html; NSBPRC (2012); 2011 Nian
Wo Guo Gao Ji Shu Chan Pin Guo Ji Mao Yi Zhuang Kuang Fen Xi [2011 China’s High
Technology Product International Trade Situation], NAT’L STATISTICS BUREAU OF CHINA,
available at http://www.sts.org.cn/tjbg/gjscy/documents/2012/20120702.htm.
11 Second generation innovation is innovation around existing inventions, goods, and
services. This includes improvements, simplifications, new applications and uses, new processes,
and new ways of producing existing products.
12 DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN: GOVERNMENT,
INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA (2011) [hereinafter
BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN].
13 Labor costs in China have been rapidly rising. While other emerging economies stand to
benefit from some low-margin industries that are leaving China—garment assembly in
particular—China remains a highly-valued destination for investment. See The End of Cheap

Murphree Breznitz, FINAL for publication (Do Not Delete)

4/26/2013 11:56 AM

2013 FRAGMENTATION AND STRUCTURED UNCERTAINTY

199

interesting is that while the rest of the world stands in awe of the
country’s achievement, China’s leaders fret China’s lack of
“innovativeness.”14
Since Opening and Reform began in 1978,15 China has sought to
accomplish a primary overarching goal: China is to become a
moderately well off country.16 Cultivating economic growth and
innovative capacity is essential to realizing this goal.
The question therefore is why, even after attaining such industrial
and R&D power, has China failed to become independently innovative,
particularly in information and communication technology (ICT)?
Despite the accumulation of manufacturing capabilities and the gradual
integration of the product chain within China, core technologies and the
architecture for critical platforms continue to be developed, and
protected by intellectual property rights (IPR), by foreign firms located
outside the country.17 To combat this apparent weakness of Chinese
firms’ slim IPR portfolios, China’s leaders have pursued a variety of
policy initiatives. Since the 1980s, there have been an array of centrally,
regionally, and locally directed programs including the well-known 863
and Torch Programs, the 973 Program, and the “Mega-Projects” of the
Medium-Long Range Plan for Science and Technology.18 These
programs aimed to foster commercialization of Chinese-developed
technologies, push development of basic R&D, and encourage
development of globally competitive capital-intensive technology
industries. By the late 1990s, these efforts concentrated on achieving the
goal of bringing about “indigenous innovation,” namely, products,
technology, and brands that are designed, developed, and owned by
Chinese companies.19 Most recently, the push for indigenous innovation
has come to include the promotion of technology standards.20 This
China, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2012, at 83.
14 See President Hu Jintao: Chinese R&D Needs More Innovation, ASIAN SCIENTIST (July 9,
2012),
http://www.asianscientist.com/academia/chinese-president-hu-jintao-research-anddevelopment-innovation-2012.
15 See generally The Second Long March, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 33.
16 John Ross, ‘Moderately Prosperous Society’ is Key Goal for China, CHINA.ORG.CN (Nov.
14, 2013), http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-11/14/content_27108452.htm.
17 Tian Suning: Di San Ci Gong Ye Ge Ming He Xin Ji Shu Zhong Guo Ji ben Mei You
[Suning Tian: China Basically Lacks any Core Technologies of the Third Industrial Revolution],
HEXUN (Nov. 29, 2009), http://news.hexun.com/2012-11-29/148520505.html; Zhuan Jia: Zhong
Guo He Xin Ji Shu Luo Hou Guo Wai Liang Dai: Bu Neng Mang Mu Le Guan [Expert: China’s
Core Technology Lags Foreign Countries’ by Two Generations: China Cannot be Blindly
(Apr.
17,
2007),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2007Optimistic],
XINHUANET
04/17/content_5985993.htm.
18 See Cao Cong, Richard P. Suttmeier & Denis Fred Simon, China’s 15-year Science and
Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 38–43.
19 See Issue Brief: New Developments in China’s Domestic Policies, U.S. China Business
Council,
Jan.
2010,
at
1,
available
at
https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2010/domestic_innovation_policies.pdf.
20 For a discussion of technology standards efforts, see infra Part I.
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effort has attracted wide attention from business and government. Many
foreign observers fear China is using technology standards as a
protectionist tool.21 However, to date none of these policy initiatives or
attempts at domestic technology standards have yielded the level of
technological independence or indigenous innovation sought by the
Chinese central government.
This Article discusses the history of China’s attempts to develop
indigenous technology standards. A case study is presented on China’s
attempts to develop digital optical storage media standards, the failure
of which we attribute to fragmentation of production and structured
uncertainty in China’s economy. Despite the market failures of China’s
domestic standards development efforts, we conclude by highlighting
some of the appurtenant benefits they produce for Chinese
manufacturers.
I. TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS AS A CASE FOR CONSTRAINTS
Over the past fifteen years, China has used technology standards
promotion as a possible policy tool for encouraging indigenous
innovation.22 However, as with other attempts to promote indigenous
capabilities, China has struggled to develop indigenous technology
standards that use wholly or mostly Chinese-developed embedded
technologies. The continued failure to do so stems from the intersection
of two forces: the global fragmentation of production and China’s
political economic climate of structured uncertainty.23 These two forces
do enable specific types of innovative activities and standards
development. Indeed, they make China highly competitive within those
specific fields. Yet, at the same time, they also constrain the options for
policy and practice available to firms and organizations in an economy.
These constraints limit the effectiveness of technology standards as a
21 SCOTT KENNEDY, RICHARD P. SUTTMEIER & JUN SU, STANDARDS, STAKEHOLDERS AND
INNOVATION, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, NBR SPECIAL REPORT NO. 15 (Sept. 2008)
[hereinafter KENNEDY ET AL., STANDARDS, STAKEHOLDERS AND INNOVATION]; RICHARD P.
SUTTMEIER & XIANGKUI YAO, CHINA’S POST-WTO TECHNOLOGY POLICY: STANDARDS,
SOFTWARE, AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF TECHNONATIONALISM, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN
RESEARCH, NBR SPECIAL REPORT NO. 7 (May 2004); RICHARD P. SUTTMEIER, XIANGKUI YAO
& ALEX ZIXIANG TAN, STANDARDS OF POWER? TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S NATIONAL STANDARDS STRATEGY, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN
RESEARCH, NBR SPECIAL REPORT NO. 10 (June 2006); DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE,
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM’N, THE RISE OF CHINA IN TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS:
NEW
NORMS
IN
OLD
INSTITUTIONS
(2013),
available
at
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/USCC%20Report%20%20The%20Rise%20of%20
China%20in%20Technology%20Standards.pdf [hereinafter BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, THE RISE
OF CHINA IN TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS].
22 See KENNEDY ET AL., STANDARDS, STAKEHOLDERS AND INNOVATION, supra note 21;
Greg Linden, China Standard Time: A Study in Strategic Industrial Policy, 6 BUS. & POL. 1
(2004).
23 See infra Parts I.A–B.
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means of fostering the development of wholly new indigenous
technologies. Nonetheless, as discussed below, even if the policies to
encourage indigenous innovations have failed to result in a
commercially successful indigenous technology standard, the policies
do succeed in encouraging Chinese actors to capitalize on the skills they
currently possess.
A. Technology Standards and China’s Historical Framework
Technology standards are agreed-upon technology platforms for
interconnection, operation, or function on which other applications,
improvements, and innovations can be made;24 they are integral to
modern life. Information technology, and particularly technologies’
ability to effectively communicate information, is entirely based on
widely-adopted and accepted standards. Whether these standards are
internationally developed, as was the International Organization for
Standardization’s (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) suite, or
domestically developed, as was the United States Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) predecessor to the Transmission
Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP),25 such common
protocols are necessary for electronic devices to communicate and
exchange data. To illustrate, the Universal Serial Bus (USB), which was
developed by an initial group of U.S. computer firms including Intel,
IBM, and Microsoft, has become the global standard for interfacing
computer peripherals with the main system.26 The uniform
incorporation of USB into computers and computer peripherals
(keyboards, printers, disc drives, etc.) replaced the need for multiple
incompatible jacks, which had made it difficult to design and market
products for any and all types of personal computers. Use of USB
helped alleviate market confusion and increased the market for
peripherals, as buyers can now confidently purchase new hardware
assured of its compatibility with their in-place computer systems.
While there may be, and often are, competing standards for a given
technology, technology standards often achieve quasi-monopoly status
in world markets. For example, consider Microsoft’s Office Suite:
although there are competing software options, including free opensource and online tools, Microsoft’s Office Suite still dominates the
24 Charles P. Kindleberger, Standards as Public, Collective, and Private Goods, 36 KYKLOS
377 (1983).
25 These technologies were the first networking standards designed to enable computers to
share and transmit data. The OSI standard was developed and approved under ISO, while TCP/IP
grew out of military research. TCP/IP is the main technology that makes the Internet possible. See
generally JERRY FITZGERALD, BUSINESS DATA COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING (11th ed.
2011).
26 Peter Seebach, Standards and Specs: The Ins and Outs of USB, IBM DEVELOPER WORKS
(Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/power/library/pa-spec7/index.html.
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global market in “business productivity software” with nearly 90% of
the market.27 This monopoly enhances Microsoft’s brand value and
makes it difficult for competing—even potentially better—technologies
to take root in the market. Firms whose technology is incorporated into
a dominant standard can earn massive returns, while those who
supported a losing standard can find their R&D investment wasted.
Technology standards can be divided into de facto (market-based)
and de jure standards.28 De facto standards, such as Sony Blu-Ray, are
set through market competition where the winning standard or format
pushes competitors. De jure standards are developed, set, and
administered by institutionalized technology standards bodies. These
bodies can be non-governmental organizations with global membership,
such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), or
state membership-based bodies, such as the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the ISO.29 At the national level,
there are non-governmental bodies, such as the American National
Standardization Institute (ANSI) or European Technical Standards
Institute (ETSI),30 that define national or regional standards. Within
these international or national-level organizations, specific technical
committees are established to develop standards for a given technology
or area of interest.31 Under technical committees, working groups of
experts propose, test, debate, and adopt protocols to incorporate into the
final standard. Generally speaking, inclusion of technologies or
approval of protocols is accomplished through consensus and majority
vote.
This system of technology standards organizations, which
developed over the last century in the industrialized West, was only
recently grafted onto China’s political economy. While China joined the
ITU and ISO in the first half of the twentieth century, after the 1949
Revolution, China’s economic, political, and standards institutions were
re-oriented towards the Soviet Union.32 Accordingly, China’s
technology standardization system was then established under Soviet

27 Shira Ovide, Microsoft Hits Back as Google Muscles In, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2012, at B1,
available
at
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303644004577525383396956086.html.
28 Paul A. David & Shane Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards: An
Introduction to Recent Research, 1 ECONS. OF INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 3 (1990).
29 See ISO, www.iso.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2013); ITU, www.itu.int (last visited Apr. 7,
2013); IEEE, www.ieee.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
30 See ETSI, www.etsi.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2013); ANSI, www.ansi.org (last visited Apr.
7, 2013).
31 See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen, The European Telecommunication Standards Institute: A
Preliminary Analysis, 14 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 521 (1990).
32 BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, THE RISE OF CHINA IN TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS, supra note
21.
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tutelage in the 1950s.33 This Soviet-influenced system, which governed
weights, measures, health, safety, and other generally non-controversial
areas, endured in China until the rise of Deng Xiaoping in the late
1970s.34 Withstanding various reorganizations and name changes,
China’s national technology standards body, now known as the
Standardization Administration of China (SAC), has existed
continuously since 1956.35 It is important to note that structurally, and
in terms of institutional culture, China’s formal system of
standardization is still influenced by the Soviet-designed planned
economy standardization system. Soviet-style institutions emphasize
top-down direction and state-leadership of technology development and
economic initiatives. In interviews we conducted,36 many industry and
company representatives noted that to this day, there is reticence in
Chinese industry to take the lead in standards activities unless the state
has already declared its interests or initiated efforts.
During the Cultural Revolution, China’s economic and industrial
infrastructure, and even planning apparatus, largely collapsed. The 1978
initiation of Opening and Reform led China to rejoin the international
standards community. In 1978, China was re-admitted to the ISO.37 In
joining Western-led standards organizations, Western norms and formal
organizational practices regarding standardization practice and
procedure were gradually grafted onto the then-reforming Chinese
political economy.38 China’s legal and practical approach to, as well as
use of, standards must thus be considered in the context of China’s
reforming and uncertain political economy in the last two decades of the
twentieth century following its opening up to the Western world.
B. The Role of Structured Uncertainty and Global Fragmentation of
Product in China’s Innovation System and Technology Standards
Two leading forces have and continue to shape China’s innovation
system and the role played by, as well as the means of using, technology
standards: structured uncertainty and the global fragmentation of
production.

33 Ping Wang, Yiyi Wang & John Hill, Zhong Guo De Biao Zhun Zhan Lue—Cheng Jiu Yu
Tiao Zhan [China’s Technology Standards Strategy: Achievements and Challenges] 2 (East-West
Center, National Bureau of Asian Research, Working Papers: Economic Series No. 107, Oct. 14,
2009), available at http://cdn.nbr.org/downloads/CS09_WANG_Ping_Paper_CH.pdf (in
Chinese) and http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/econwp107.pdf (in English).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1–2.
36 See supra note 1.
37 Ping et al., supra note 33, at 2.
38 See id. at 2–4.
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i. Structured Uncertainty in China
Structured uncertainty may be defined as an agreement to disagree
about the proper objectives and methods of public policy or business
practices.39 In China’s political economy, policy makers and
administrators do not necessarily agree, nor do they unequivocally
define, the appropriate or accepted patterns and limits for policy or
business practice. In any given policy sphere, government influence is
strong, but clear direction and limitations are often vague. As a result, it
is impossible under the force of structured uncertainty for any actor—
political or business—to know ex ante what behaviors (such as business
activities or administrative innovations) will be encouraged or
sanctioned. In such a climate, political actors and firms engage in shortterm behaviors. Further, and particularly in China, firms often seek
protection from the government by cultivating relations with the state at
different levels.
Structured uncertainty, given the persistent lack of clarity, also
implies that wherever there is clarity from government officials, all
actors in the system will respond forcefully to those objectives or
incentives. For example, while the final goals of China’s Opening and
Reform have never been clearly elucidated, since the 1980s, it has been
abundantly clear that policies or practices which produce economic
growth increase levels of investment, attract foreign investment,
increase exports, and generate employment are always welcome and
rewarded by the national government. Local and regional government
officials respond by encouraging policies guaranteed to quickly produce
these types of economic growth results. Similarly, firms move into
industrial sectors or activities likely to yield quick results. Since 2002,
the Chinese government has incorporated “standards” as goals in
China’s five year plans and provided funding for standards efforts.40
This commitment of resources shows a high degree of state interest in
developing indigenous technology standards to which firms and
academic actors have forcefully responded—insomuch as they have
become participants in the standards development process. The number
of standards developed and submitted for approval by industrial
ministries and the Standards Administration of China has increased
rapidly since 2002.41

39
40
41

BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN, supra note 12, at 12.
Ping et al., supra note 33, at 4–6, 7–9.
For a comprehensive list of Chinese standards and spreadsheets on new applications,
revisions, and programs, see National Standard Information Sharing Infrastructure, CHINESE
STANDARDS
SERVICE
NETWORK,
http://www.cssn.net.cn/pagesnew/libresources/lib_resources.jsp?libtype=NATIVE_CSIC#CNGB (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
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ii. Global Fragmentation of Production
The global fragmentation of production is the process by which
goods and services are no longer produced in single locations by
vertically integrated, and nationally oriented, firms.42 Rather, managers
and engineers break the production process into modules that can then
be outsourced and/or offshored. Fragmentation of production has
industry-wide and often international effects, as it means that different
regions can now specialize in individual stages of production, not
necessarily the entire industry. For example, California’s Silicon Valley
was once a center for manufacturing of electronics and information
technology hardware, but is now dominated by companies that
specialize in the invention and design of new high technology goods
and services.43 The development, design for production, and
manufacturing of these goods and services is now outsourced to
dedicated firms, often located overseas.44 This fragmentation has
enabled the Silicon Valley region to specialize in certain stages of
production, while other regions and firms can specialize in other stages.
Thus, the fragmentation of production has fundamentally changed the
way goods and services are produced.
Fragmentation also implies that different regions, specializing as
they do in different stages of production, will develop different sets of
specialized capabilities and therefore have different approaches to both
innovation and the management of innovation. To illustrate the impact
of the interaction of structured uncertainty and the fragmentation of
production on technology standards behavior in China, we now turn to
an illustrative brief case study looking at China’s digital optical storage
media industry and standards. This case shows how these two forces
have enabled and encouraged certain behaviors, while constraining
others, just as has been seen throughout China’s broader innovation
system.
II. CONSTRAINED AND ENABLED: CHINA’S APPROACH TO DIGITAL
OPTICAL STORAGE MEDIA STANDARDS
Common wisdom expressed in the popular press holds that as
China has already gathered unto itself so much of the world’s
42 FRAGMENTATION: NEW PRODUCTION PATTERNS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Sven W.
Arndt & Henryk Kierzkowski eds., 2001); Peter Gourevitch, Roger Bohn & David McKendrick,
Globalization of Production: Insights from the Hard Drive Disk Industry, 28 WORLD DEV. 301
(2000); LOCATING GLOBAL ADVANTAGE: INDUSTRY DYNAMICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY (Martin Kenney & Richard Florida eds., 2003); Timothy J. Sturgeon, Modular
Production Networks: A New American Model of Industrial Organization, 11 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 451 (2002).
43 Timothy J. Sturgeon, What Really Goes On in Silicon Valley? Spatial Clustering and
Dispersal in Modular Production Networks, 3 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 199 (2003).
44 Id.
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production capacity in IT hardware and electronics, deep understanding
of, and eventual control over, this industry and the technological
architectures governing it will soon follow.45 Indeed, a widely read
article claims the migration of manufacturing capacity and divorce of
production from research and design will undermine the capabilities of
outsourcers and benefit firms that retain or specialize in production.46
Yet the story of China’s attempt to develop a technology standard for
digital optical storage media demonstrates how this theory may overestimate the technology benefits producers reap in a world of
fragmented production. Since the mid-1990s, China has attempted with
little commercial success to develop unique technology standards for
digital optical storage media.47 These failed attempts show that despite
China’s ever-growing dominance in production, this has not translated
into a transfer of novel-product innovative capabilities.
Digital optical storage media include CD and DVD players,
computer disc drives, and high-definition discs. Many of the
technologies included in standards for digital optical storage media are
also included in standards for the digital transmission of analog data for
online streaming media, such as used in Internet TV and much of high
definition cable broadcasting.48 Briefly stated, the technology behind
optical media is a means of storing analog data (audio and video
transmitted to the listener or viewer as waves) in digital (1s and 0s)
format.49 In order to convert digital data into analog signals, a device
uses a laser to read the disc and then a software codec (encoderdecoder) converts the digital information back into an analog wave.50
The writing process also uses compression algorithms to reduce the
amount of space needed for storage, thus making discs smaller and
increasing the capacity in a given amount of space.51 All of these
component technologies are subject to codification in standards for a
given type of optical storage media. For example, a device using a
standard based on one type of compression algorithm will not be
45 Devon Swezey, As Manufacturing Shifts Abroad, Innovation’s Reward Dwindles,
BREAKTHROUGH
(Sept.
16,
2010),
http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/as_manufacturing_shifts_abroad; Charles Duhigg & Keith
Bradsher, How the US Lost Out on iPhone Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, at A1.
46 See Stephen Denning, Why Amazon Can’t Make a Kindle in the USA, FORBES (Aug. 17,
2011, 9:33 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/08/17/why-amazon-cant-makea-kindle-in-the-usa/.
47 See generally Scott Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining
China’s Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars, 2 ASIA POL’Y 41 (2006) [hereinafter
Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions].
48 For example, the MPEG-4 standard is part of both digital optical media and wireless
transmission standards for audio and video content.
49 GRAHAM WADE, SIGNAL CODING AND PROCESSING 34 (2d ed. 1994).
50 Matt Knouff, Codecs Explained, TOPTEN REVIEWS (2012), http://cd-burning-softwarereview.toptenreviews.com/mac-cd-burning-software/codecs-explained.html.
51 Id.; WADE, supra note 49, at 34.
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compatible with a disc designed in accordance with a standard using a
different compression algorithm. The laser will be able to read the data,
but the device will be unable to convert it back into the intended analog
waves.
China began its efforts in optical storage media standards in the
mid-1990s in the hope of protecting the Chinese market from the
coming DVD standard.52 However, the Chinese technologies developed
in this field found little market acceptance outside of China.53 Rather,
despite the rapidly increasing scale of Chinese production capabilities in
IT hardware and electronics, the international de facto DVD standard
came to the forefront even within China.54
By the late 1990s, the DVD standard, which was developed by an
alliance of Japanese, American, and European companies, became
established. Although initially DVD players were an expensive luxury
with a comparatively limited market, hundreds of Chinese
manufacturers established DVD player production lines.55 The
explosion in production capacity resulted in a rapid decline in price that
fueled mass-market demand for DVD players.56 Production in China
expanded rapidly, from 3.5 million DVD players in 2000, to 70
million—seventy five percent of world output—by 2003.57 Although
the potential global market was enormous, the profit potential for many
Chinese firms, particularly for later entrants into production, was very
limited. As a more-or-less fully developed and codified technology,
DVD players left little room for Chinese firms to alter the standard or
provide alternatives to foreign mandated patents and their associated
royalties.58 Profit margins for Chinese manufacturers fell to one dollar
per unit by 2004.59 High royalty rates became a source of constant
friction with the foreign firms controlling the DVD standard.60 While
52 See Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions, supra note 47, at 48–56;
Linden, supra note 22; Philip Qu & Carl Polley, The New Standard-Bearer, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Dec. 2005), http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/the-new-standardbearer; Junko
Yoshida & Mark Carroll, China Flexes Standards Muscle, EE TIMES (Nov. 24, 1997), available
at http://business.highbeam.com/3094/article-1G1-20027685/china-flexes-standards-muscle.
53 Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions, supra note 47, at 51–56.
54 EVD Players Not Selling as Expected in China, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Jan. 10, 2004),
http://english.people.com.cn/200401/10/eng20040110_132291.shtml [hereinafter EVD Players
Not Selling as Expected in China].
55 SCOTT KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS OF LOBBYING IN CHINA (2005).
56 Linden, supra note 22.
57 Id. at 13.
58 Id.; Tony Smith, China Unveils ‘DVD Killer’ Video Disk Format ‘HDTV quality’,
(Nov.
20,
2003,
10:35
AM),
REGISTER
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/11/20/china_unveils_dvd_killer_video/.
59 Michael Kanellos, DVD Player Profits Down to $1, CNET NEWS (Aug. 9, 2004, 3:19
AM), http://www.smallcapinvestorblog.agoracom.com/ir/edigital/forums/discussion/topics/5953dvd-player-profits-down-to-1.
60 Petteri Pyyny, Chinese DVD Player Manufacturers Take Patent Owners to Court,
NEWS
(Jan.
20,
2005,
2:02
PM),
AFTERDAWN
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China clearly dominated production, it did not have the ability to
change the standard—and hence reduce the royalties owed on
embedded technologies—which was defined and controlled by an
alliance of foreign firms. China’s manufacturers specialized in the final
assembly of DVD players. Nonetheless, China’s position as final
manufacturers offered little room for development of core research
capabilities since the technologies with, and on which, they worked
were already standardized and set.
A. The Push for an Indigenous DVD Standard
As early as 1999, China’s government proposed development of a
Chinese standard as a means of alleviating the looming financial
troubles of its manufacturers.61 Under the guidance of the Ministry of
Information Industry (MII), several government research institutes and
DVD manufacturers formed an industry alliance through an
incorporated entity called Beijing E-World Technology.62 MII and the
State Trade and Economic Commission provided $1.2 million dollars to
begin development of an indigenous Chinese red-laser based standard.63
Two years later, the Beijing E-World alliance announced completion of
a “new” Chinese standard, the Advanced High Density Disc System,
later merged with a “basically compatible” Taiwanese technology
known as Enhanced Versatile Disc (EVD).64
China’s position in global fragmented production chains meant its
firms, while involved in the E-World EVD development effort, were
limited in their ability to offer fundamentally new technology. Indeed,
while being touted as China’s tool to free itself from dependency on
foreign proprietary technology, EVD actually relied on core foreign
technology for various aspects, including video compression. For
example, the VP5 and VP6 software codecs were developed and owned
by On2, a U.S. company.65 The decoder was developed in cooperation
http://www.afterdawn.com/news/archive/5979.cfm.
61 Mike Clendenin, China Taps U.S. Partner to Keep EVD Standards, EE TIMES INDIA (Feb.
16
2006),
http://www.eetindia.co.in/ART_8800407147_1800010_NT_32a4d728.HTM#
[hereinafter Clendenin, China Taps U.S. Partner to Keep EVD Standards]; Yifan Zhang, Xiao
Shou Yu Leng EVD Die Jin Nian Nei Yao ‘Tui Shi’ [Sales Run Cold: EVD Players Will Exit the
Market Within the Year], CHENGDU SHANGBAO, Mar. 8, 2008, available at
http://news.hexun.com/2008-03-08/104291325.html.
62 China to Issue Home-Developed EVD Standard, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Oct. 28, 2003),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/28/eng20031028_127012.shtml.
63 Smith, supra note 58; Clendenin, China Taps U.S. Partner to Keep EVD Standards, supra
note 61.
64 Mike Clendenin, Taiwan Joins Chinese Effort on Proprietary DVD Format, EE TIMES
(May 24, 2002, 4:49 PM), http://eetimes.com/electronics-news/4043332/Taiwan-joins-Chineseeffort-on-proprietary-DVD-format.
65 VP5 and VP6 to Be Included in China’s EVD Standard, CHINA TECH NEWS (Nov. 18,
2003), http://www.chinatechnews.com/2003/11/18/105-vp5-and-vp6-to-be-included-in-chinasevd-standard.
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among a U.S. company LSI Logic, Beijing Homaa Microelectronics
Technology, and E-World.66 Despite state investment, strong
encouragement and broad-based industry participation, the standard
development effort did not yield a wholly Chinese standard since
significant technologies were foreign-owned and created.
However, the need to incorporate foreign technology makes sense
in light of the conditions of global fragmentation of production and
structured uncertainty in China. While central government support made
it clear that a new standard was desired, it was never clear whether this
standard would be simply adopted or made the exclusive standard
within China.67 Further, involvement of foreign firms was a pragmatic
solution to ensure the standard could be produced in a timely fashion
before government policies changed. Under fragmentation of
production, Chinese firms’ capabilities were mostly in final assembly of
electronics, not the design, or even alteration, of software-intensive core
technologies.68 As a result, their ability to develop a wholly new
standard was constrained.
Although manufacturing prowess has been stated as the first step
toward technology and standard dominance, China’s EVD standard was
not a commercial success.69 Despite much lower royalties that
manufacturers owed to IP rights holders for producing EVD standard
products ($2 per unit as opposed to $13–$20 for foreign standard units),
the popularity and relative low-cost of DVD players meant that EVD
never gained appreciable market share.70 Arrival of the High-Definition
Digital Video Disk (HD-DVD) and Blu-ray high-definition formats
further eroded EVD’s market potential. By 2006, it was clear the
standard was commercially unsuccessful; the last players were removed
from store shelves in late 2008.71
While EVD was neither a technological nor market success, by
66 Ed Frauenheim, Report: China’s Next-Generation DVD Faces Hurdles, CNET NEWS (Jan
29, 2004), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1041_3-5150373.html; Chinese Unveil Homegrown ‘EVD’
Technology, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Dec. 7, 2006, at B9; Out DVD, in EVD, CHINA ECON. REV.
(Dec. 1. 2006), http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/node/48464; Junko Yoshida, China
Unveils Its Own Video Format, EE TIMES (Nov. 18, 2003), http://eetimes.com/electronicsnews/4046157/China-unveils-its-own-video-format-item-1.
67 Smith, supra note 58; Zhong Jing, China’s EVD Standard Becomes the Industrial One,
CHINA
ECON.
NET
(July
21,
2004,
9:49
AM),
http://en.ce.cn/Insight/200407/21/t20040721_1285100.shtml.
68 BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN, supra note 12.
69 Zhen Wang, Xinke Dianzi Jituan Bei Tuoguo Chongzu: Guochan EVD de Yaozhe [Shinko
Electronics Group Manages Restructuring: The Collapse of EVD], DI YI CAIJING RIBAO (Dec.
29, 2011), available at http://tech.163.com/11/1229/01/7MDF38RQ000915BD.html; Yifan,
supra note 61.
70 EVD Players Not Selling as Expected in China, supra note 54; Linden, supra note 22, at
15–16.
71 Clendenin, China Taps U.S. Partner to Keep EVD Standards, supra note 61; Yifan, supra
note 61.
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bringing China’s challenge to global standards into the spotlight, the
standards effort quickly led to a substantial reduction in the royalties
Chinese manufacturers had to pay.72 The announcement of the EVD
standard was shortly followed by a royalty-rate concession from DVD’s
standard bearers; major patent holders agreed to only charge full
royalties for exported DVD players—a decline from $21 to $12 per
DVD player.73 For manufacturers located at the assembly end of
fragmented global production, lowering the price for necessary
intellectual property was a major victory. By early 2004, the overall
royalty rate had been further reduced to $13.80 for any exported player
as well.74 Given the position of China’s firms in fragmented production
chains, the EVD standard yielded tangible benefits for the industry. It
thus served the interest of China’s firms, given their position in global
production chains, even despite the lack of ultimate market success for
the standard.
B. A Second Wave of Indigenous Technology Standards Efforts in the
High-Definition Era
The success of standards efforts in reducing royalties would play
out again in the high-definition era. Once again, Chinese firms would
rely on foreign technology. Nonetheless, manufacturers would benefit
from the standard as it pressured the dominant standard’s patent holders
to lower their royalty rates.
In October 2005, China announced plans to develop a new violet
laser high-definition disc player.75 With broad state support, a three-part
alliance formed to develop the standard, titled China Blue HighDefinition Disk (CBHD).76 The main developers were the Optical
Memory National Engineering Research Center (OMNERC) at
Tsinghua University, the China High-Definition DVD Industry
Association (CHDA), and China Electronics Technology Group
Corporation (CETC).77 The standard took shape through subsidized
research conducted at OMNERC and CETC. The leading
commercializers of CBHD players, TCL and Shinco, enjoyed
preferential state financing in their development and production
efforts.78 In addition, other manufacturers received state subsidies to
72 Bruce Einhorn, Master of Innovation?, BUS. WEEK
(Apr. 13, 2003),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2003-04-13/master-of-innovation.
73 Linden, supra note 22, at 14.
74 EVD Players Not Selling as Expected in China, supra note 54.
75 Isabel Ding, The Blu-ray Challenge in China, CHINA INT’L BUS., Jun. 10, 2009.
76 Id.; Marcus Yam, CBHD Is China’s Own Blu-Ray Disc, TOM’S HARDWARE US (May 1,
2009), http://www.tomshardware.com/news/cbhd-china-blue-bluray-disc,7681.html.
77 Yam, supra note 76.
78 TCL and Shinco Ship First CBHD Players in China, CDR INFO (Apr. 23, 2009),
http://cdrinfo.com/Sections/News/Details.aspx?NewsId=25238.
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accelerate their development of CBHD player models.79
CBHD, however, was not entirely indigenous technology. It was
heavily based on Toshiba’s HD-DVD technology, acquired at fire-sale
prices.80 CBHD generally relied on foreign core technology in order to
function.81 According to some analysts, CBHD did not deserve state
support or to even be called a “Chinese” standard as up to ninety
percent of the technology was derived from Toshiba’s HD-DVD
standard.82
Yet, like EVD efforts, the development of CBHD again forced a
reduction in royalties Chinese manufacturers owed to foreign IPR
holders. The royalties for the CBHD players were set at only $8 per
player.83 As happened with the release of the EVD, Sony’s Blu-Ray
Alliance reduced the mandatory royalties for manufacturers of its
players to $9.50 per player.84
As a testament to the nature of structured uncertainty, while CBHD
enjoyed direct state support, it was not the only locally developed
standard in this field. Firms hedged their bets to ensure their projects
would find market outlets. Under structured uncertainty, there is always
the risk that the government will withdraw support from a standard, or
adopt an alternative, if one is not developed in a timely fashion. It was
thus rational for firms to also support the entirely foreign Sony Blu-Ray
standard. One noteworthy project was Guangzhou Digital Rise
Technology’s development of an audio-video codec (DRA) for the
globally dominant Blu-Ray standard.85 As part of an agreement
permitting sales of Blu-Ray products in China, the Blu-Ray Disc
Alliance accepted the Chinese DRA audio-video codec as part of the
Blu-Ray 2.3 package.86 As with EVD, the main benefit for Chinese
firms in their locations in global production chains was through the

79
80

Id.
Jimmy Hsu & Adam Hwang, Hollywood Movie Studios Not Supporting China-Developed
CBHD, say Taiwan Optical Disc Makers, DIGITIMES (Aug. 29, 2008),
http://www.digitimes.com/news/a20080828PD215.html; Nobutaka Hirooka & Tsunoru
Nakajima, Next Generation DVD Formats Go Head to Head Once Again, NIKKEI BUS. (June 1,
2009), http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/eng/20090601/196293/.
81 Guo Ji Jin Rong Bao, Zhang Bao Quan ‘Pao Hong’ Qing Hua Guang Pan Yan Jiu Zhong
Xin [Zhang Baoquan Attacks Tsinghua Laser Disc Research Center], CNFOL (2005).
82 Hsu & Hwang, supra note 80; Hirooka & Nakajim, supra note 80.
83 Ding, supra note 75; Blu-Ray DVD Players: Industry on the Rise, R&D in High-Gear,
GLOBAL SOURCES-ELECS. (June 15, 2009), http://www.electronics.globalsources.com/gsol/I/Bluray-player/a/9000000105354.htm.
84 Ding, supra note 75; Blu-Ray DVD Players: Industry on the Rise, R&D in High-Gear,
supra note 83.
85 China DRA Passes Technical Evaluation for Blu-Ray Disc Format, CHINA SOURCING
NEWS (July 15, 2008), http://www.chinasourcingnews.com/2008/07/15/16342-china-dra-passestechnical-evaluation-for-blu-ray-disc-format/.
86 Id.; Chinese Audio Technology Included in the Blu-Ray Specifications, CDR INFO (Mar.
20, 2009), http://www.cdrinfo.com/sections/news/Details.aspx?NewsId=25046.
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lowering of royalty rates they had to pay to produce for the globally
dominant standard. For manufacturing specialists, this benefit cannot be
underestimated. When intellectual property is just one of many
technology inputs, it is in the best interest of a manufacturer to reduce
the cost of that input and thus raise potential profitability.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In developing technology standards, China has not yet managed to
find the “secret” of fostering independent novel-product innovation.
China’s standards, as shown in digital optical storage media, are still
heavily reliant on foreign technology.87 However, the development of
standards does yield tangible benefits for Chinese manufacturers that
face difficult cost challenges.88 Under the fragmentation of global
production, Chinese firms have come to specialize in the final assembly
and integration of electronic goods.89 However, through participation in
the development of an alternative standard, these firms benefit by
receiving lower royalty rates on the goods they already produce.90
The inability of Chinese firms to create globally successful
standards can be attributed in part to structured uncertainty.91 There is
no clear assurance that a unique Chinese technology standard will have
a guaranteed market in China. In the cases detailed above, there was
state support for standard development, but never an unequivocal
commitment to one standard or another, much less a guaranteed
protected market. Without this potential market, firms are hesitant to
invest heavily in a Chinese standard since there were, at least in the
cases discussed here, existing and market-tested foreign standards. This
weakens the potential for broad adoption by manufacturers, which is
needed to push a new standard into the market. At the same time, some
government funds are made available for standardization efforts.92
These government grants and subsidies are important sources of R&D
financing, especially in smaller firms. Yet, since there is no way to
know how long the state will remain committed to, and financially
supportive of, a given effort, it is necessary to join in early and attempt
to complete the standard as quickly as possible, even if this means
involving foreign firms and foreign technologies.93
It should come as no surprise that with this environment,
technology standards policies and promotion result in creation of

87
88
89
90
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92
93

See supra Part II.
See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 72–74, 83–84 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra notes 62–63, 76–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65–66, 80–82 and accompanying text.
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technologies and standards that reveal the strengths of Chinese
enterprises. The standards show that China’s firms are adept at building
on foreign technological leads and bringing technologies to commercial
fruition.94 However, they remain unable to push their own breakthrough
technologies and even indigenous standards remain reliant on core
foreign technology.95 With the climate of structured uncertainty,
shortening time horizons, and fragmentation of production fostering
specific capabilities, this result appears quite logical. For the short- to
medium-term, we should not expect to see major market-shifting
standardized technologies emerging wholly within China. The forces of
structured uncertainty and global fragmented production act to constrain
this outcome.96 However, those same forces also enable Chinese firms,
critical manufacturers for the whole global production chain, to benefit
from the standards efforts that are created.97
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See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra notes 72–74, 83–84 and accompanying text.

